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Its purposes, as well as that of international uniformity of laws, would

5
be better served by a single statute modeled after the British law, "
which allows shipowners to limit their liability without entirely depriving claimants of recovery.
It is difficult to justify COGSA and Harter Act provisions abrogating
cargo owners' right to recover damages. The chief virtue of those provisions has been the ability of the courts to circumvent them through
the rule of The Chattahoochee. Statutory reform, of course, requires
congressional action. Until it is forthcoming, the courts may only apply
the laws to achieve substantial justice whenever possible. Reliable
Transfer, by replacing the divided damages rule with comparative
negligence, helps to facilitate that task. The next step should be comparative contribution.

EDWARD P. NICKINSON, III

Constitutional Law-DuE

PROCESS-POSTJUDGMENT

MENT PROCEDURE THAT GIVES DEBTOR No NOTICE

WAGE

GARNISH-

OR OPPORTUNITY

To ASSERT STATUTORY EXEMPTION PRIOR TO GARNISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023
(M.D. Fla. 1974).
On July 13, 1973, a judgment was entered for Liberty Loan Corporation of Duval against Etta Jane Brown and her husband Saul F. Brown.
On July 25, 1973, a motion for garnishment after judgment was filed by
Liberty Loan and a writ of garnishment was issued by the clerk of the
circuit and county courts. The motion for garnishment was made and
the writ of garnishment was issued pursuant to sections 77.01 and
77.03 of the Florida Statutes. The writ was served on Etta Brown's
employer, Baby's Best Diaper Service, which was required to withhold
a portion of her wages. After notice was received from her employer,
she filed an affidavit of exemption pursuant to section 222.12, Florida
Statutes, stating that she was the head of a family and that the money
attached was for personal labor and services. Liberty Loan denied the
Eyer, note 17 supra; Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other Than Harter and COGSA) of
Carrier'sLiability to Cargo-Limitationof Liability and the Fire Statute, 45 TUL. L. REV.
959 (1971).

58.

See note 25 supra.
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affidavit of exemption. Following a hearing, the writ of garnishment
was ordered dissolved because she did in fact fall within the exemption.'
Etta Brown then filed a complaint for declaratory relief on behalf
of herself and a class of persons similarly situated, asserting that sections 77.01, 77.03, and 222.12, and the actions of the defendants taken
pursuant to those sections, violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. In Brown v.
Liberty Loan Corp.2 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida held that those sections, to the extent that they
permit postjudgment garnishment of wages without prior notice to the
debtor and an opportunity for a hearing, violate procedural due process
under the fourteenth amendment3 The decision is presently on ap4
peal.
Florida's postjudgment garnishment procedures are governed by
sections 77.01 and 77.03, Florida Statutes. Section 77.01 gives a judgment creditor the right to garnishee any property of the debtor held
5
by third persons, and any debt owed to the debtor by third persons.
Section 77.03 provides that to obtain a garnishment writ the creditor
must file a motion specifying the amount of judgment and asserting
that he does not believe the judgment debtor possesses visible property
sufficient to satisfy the judgment."
1. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1026-27 (M.D. Fla. 1974). For
discussion of the statutory provisions involved in Brown, see notes 5-8 and accompanying
text infra.
2. 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
3. Id. at 1039. In addition to the merits of the case, the court discussed abstention,
the alleged necessity of a three-judge court, and alleged overinclusiveness of the class.
Id. at 1027-31. This comment deals only with that portion of the opinion devoted to
the merits.
4. Florida v. Brown, No. 75-1460 (5th Cir., filed Jan. 9, 1975).
5. FLA. STAT. § 77.01 (1973) provides:
Every person who has sued to recover a debt or has recovered judgment in any
court against any person, natural or corporate, has a right to a writ of garnishment,
in the manner hereinafter provided, to subject any debt due to defendant by a
third person, and any tangible or intangible personal property of defendant in the
possession or control of a third person. The officers, agents and employees of any
companies or corporations are third persons in regard to the companies or corporations, and as such are subject to garnishment after judgment against the companies
or corporations.
6. FLA. STAT. § 77.03 (1973) provides:
After judgment has been obtained against defendant but before the writ of
garnishment is issued, the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, shall file a motion
(which shall not be verified or negative defendant's exemptions) stating the amount
of the judgment and that movant does not believe that defendant has in his
possession visible property on which a levy can be made sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. The motion may be filed and the writ issued either before or after the
return of execution.
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Garnishment of wages is subject to sections 222.11 and 222.12,
Florida Statutes. Section 222.11, entitled "Exemption of wages from
garnishment," flatly prohibits issuance of garnishment writs affecting
wages of heads of households.' But section 222.12, entitled "Proceedings for exemption," gives judgment debtors the right to assert wage
exemptions only after the writ has been issued." Furthermore, if the
judgment creditor promptly denies the debtor's affidavit of exemption,
the writ remains in force until a trial is held to determine applicability
of the exemption. In Brown, the court considered section 222.12, but
ignored section 222.11.
The Brown court recognized that due process questions require a
two-step analysis.9 The first step is to determine whether the due process
clause is applicable. That question turns on whether challenged procedures affect liberty or property interests. Once such interests are
identified, the remaining question is what protections are required to
implement due process guarantees in a given case. Though notice and
opportunity to be heard are fundamental due process requirements,
the nature and timing of notice and hearing are determined by
balancing competing interests. °
As applied to judgment debtors who qualify for the exemption, the
Florida postjudgment garnishment procedures arguably cause depriva7. FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1973) provides:
No writ of attachment or garnishment or other process shall issue from any of the
courts of this state to attach or delay the payment of any money or other thing due
to any person who is the head of a family residing in this state, when the money or
other thing is due for the personal labor or services of such person.
8. FLA. STAT. § 222.12 (1973) provides:
Whenever any money or other thing due for labor or services as aforesaid is attached by such process, the person to whom the same is due and owing may make
oath before the officer who issued the process that the money attached is due for
the personal labor and services of such person, and he is the head of a family
residing in said state. When such an affidavit is made, notice of same shall be
forthwith given to the party, or his attorney, who sued out the process, and if the
facts set forth in such affidavit are not denied under oath within two days after
the service of said notice, the process shall be returned, and all proceedings under
the same shall cease. If the facts stated in the affidavit are denied by the party who
sued out the process within the time above set forth and under oath, then the
matter shall be tried by the court from which the writ or process issued, in like
manner as claims to property levied upon by writ of execution are tried, and
the money or thing attached shall remain subject to the process until released by
the judgment of the court which shall try the issue.
9. 392 F. Supp. at 1031. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 167-68 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 212 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
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tion of three interests protected by the due process clause: a liberty
interest in reputation; a property interest in the continued use of
wages; and a property interest in the benefit created by the statutory
exemption." Brown was complicated considerably by the possibility
that Florida's procedures affect these multiple interests-each of which
theoretically requires distinct due process analysis. The case was made
even more difficult by the fact that each of these interests has been the
subject of recent Supreme Court decisions that leave considerable uncertainties. Goss v. Lopez,12 decided after Brown, suggests that the
Court is expanding the range of reputational interests that fall within
due process liberty. A line of cases beginning with Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp."3 and culminating in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc.14 has dealt with due process requirements applicable to

prejudgment creditors' remedies that temporarily deprive defendants
of property interests in wages and personal property. Though the
Court appears to be applying a balancing test in this area, it has not
clearly stated the factors to be weighed. Finally, a line of cases beginning
with Goldberg v. Kelly is and Board of Regents v. Roth 6 has made it
plain that certain governmentally conferred benefits-entitlements-are
property within the meaning of the due process clause. Those cases
have not, however, settled how procedural provisions included in or
related to a statutory benefit affect the scope of the entitlement.
Goss v. Lopez held that the suspension of students for misconduct
worked a deprivation of reputational interests that fell within
fourteenth amendment liberty.' 7 The Court stated that charges of
misconduct "could seriously damage the students' standing with their
fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment."'' 8 If, as the Goss minority
implied, 9 the majority opinion reflects a willingness to expand the
11. The fact that judgment debtors may only be temporarily deprived of their
property interests does not remove those interests from the ambit of the due process
clause. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975),
quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). Temporary deprivations may, however, require less stringent due process protections than permanent deprivations. See
id.; cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). See also note 36 infra.
12. 419 U.S. 565 (1975), noted in 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 301 (1975).
13. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
14. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
17. 419 U.S. at 576. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). Goss
also rested on a finding that suspensions deprived students of an entitlement to public
education. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text infra.
18. 419 U.S. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. at 589 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, argued that under past cases liberty interests were implicated
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scope of reputational protections, debtors may have a new weapon in
attacks on summary creditors' remedies. Since unjustified garnishment
may seriously affect a debtor's standing in the eyes of his employer,
his banker, or his creditors,2 0 it is now arguable that unjustified garnishment constitutes deprivation of a liberty interest. Though the Brown
court did not consider this issue directly, it was very concerned that
unjustified garnishment might result in loss of employment. 21 If the
Supreme Court shares this fear, it should not find it difficult to analogize
the type of reputational interests considered in Goss to those reputational interests affected by garnishment.
While it is unclear whether garnishment affects liberty interests,
there is no doubt that it affects property interests in wages. The
difficulty in this area is discerning what steps are required to protect
such property interests. There has been no question that when wages
or personalty is taken by government action, notice and hearing" 'must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' "22 But
cases dealing with creditors' summary remedies have left the meaning
of the quoted phrase uncertain. In the context of creditors' prejudgment remedies, the central question has been whether due process requires that debtors be given an opportunity to speak before any deprivation of property occurs, or whether it is sufficient that the debtor
have an opportunity to speak before the deprivation becomes final.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., the Supreme Court found

that the special importance of wages made it inappropriate to permit
prejudgment garnishment of wages without giving the wage earner
advance notice and opportunity to be heard.2 3 In Fuentes v. Shevin,
the Court held Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes unconstitutional because they permitted seizure of personalty without prior notice
only if damage to reputation was "serious" or "grievous," citing Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
See 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 301, 306 n.28 (1975).
20. Cf., e.g., Phillips v. Bartolomie, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58 (Ct. App. 1975); Cf. also
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 n.21 (1972). In Phillips, a checking
account was garnisheed even though all funds in that account were exempt from garnishment. After receiving the garnishment writ, the bank dishonored the debtor's checks
and informed payees that the account had been closed. In evaluating the constitutionality
of California statutes that permitted garnishment of such exempt funds without prior
hearing, the court did not consider the possible impact of those procedures on debtors'
reputational interests. The Phillipscourt held the California procedures were not violative
of due process. In so holding, it rejected Brown, id. 121 Cal. Rptr. at 61 n.13, and
relied heavily on Raigoza v. Sperl, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1973); see notes 75, 120
infra.
21. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
22. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965).
23. 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
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and hearing.2 4 The Court took the view that, except in "extraordinary
situations," notice and hearing are required prior to any taking of a
25
property interest.
26
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., however, the Court receded from

that premise. It asserted that where only property interests are
involved, due process is generally satisfied if a hearing is provided
before the taking becomes final." The Mitchell Court, in effect, treated
the Sniadach situation as the exception, stressing both the special nature
of wages and the substantial risks that the Sniadach wage garnishment
28
procedures would be abused by creditors. The Court indicated that

the Fuentes holding resulted from failure to provide adequate safeguards against abuse of prejudgment repossession procedures: creditors
could obtain repossession writs by making conclusory allegations to a
court functionary, and a hearing on the propriety of the repossession
29
was not provided promptly after the taking. The Court felt the
Louisiana sequestration procedures at issue in Mitchell did provide
adequate safeguards against wrongful repossession, and minimized the
impact of repossession on the debtor.2 0 The Louisiana procedure required a creditor seeking a sequestration writ to file a bond and make
a showing to a judicial officer of specific facts supporting issuance of
the writ. It further required an immediate postseizure hearing at which
the creditor was required to prove the grounds on which the writ was
issued, and provided for assessment of damages if the creditor's claim
proved unfounded.2 1 The Court held that this procedure "effects a
constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the
parties."2

2

The Court stated:

[Tihe Louisiana system seeks to minimize the risk of error of a
wrongful interim possession by the creditor. The system protects the
debtor's interest in every conceivable way, except allowing him to
have the property to start with, and this is done in pursuit of what
we deem an acceptable arrangement pendente lite to put the property in the possession of the party who furnishes protection3 against
loss or damage to the other pending trial on the merits.
24.
25.
note 36
26.
27.
28.

407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
Id. at 90; accord, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). But see
infra.
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 611-14.
Id. at 614.

29. Id. at 615-16 (White, J.); see note 37 and accompanying text infra.
30. Id. at 616-18.
31. For the statutory provisions, see id. at 620-23.
32. Id. at 607.
33. Id. at 618.
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4

decided after
Brown, involved prejudgment garnishment of a corporate bank account. The Georgia Supreme Court had reasoned that the Sniadach
rule was applicable only to wages 35 The Supreme Court, however,
stated that Fuentes was applicable to the Georgia procedure.3 6 Fuentes,
the Court stated, stood for the proposition that due process was violated
where an official seizure occurred without prior notice and opportunity
to be heard "or other safeguard against mistaken repossession."

37

The

Di-Chem Court then found that the Georgia procedure suffered from
the Fuentes infirmity. The Georgia procedure, unlike that in Mitchell,
permitted issuance of the garnishment writ on conclusory allegations
made to "a court clerk without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a judicial officer. ' ' 3 In response to

arguments that garnishment of corporate assets was distinguishable
from garnishment of consumer goods, the Court stated: "It may be
that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely suffer
irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts, but the
probability of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great
so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial
error."3"
Though these cases suggest a balancing test is being applied, the
Court has not clearly indicated what factors are to be weighed. The
Mitchell Court referred to the necessity of evaluating the impact on
debtors of temporary property deprivations, 40 and to the need to ac34. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
35. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 201 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Ga. 1973).
36. 419 U.S. at 605. Some members of the Mitchell Court felt that Mitchell overruled
Fuentes, see 416 U.S. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In Di-Chem, several Justices concluded Fuentes had been revitalized, see 419 U.S. at 608
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 615-16, (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). But Di-Chem cannot be read as a reversion to the pre-Mitchell presumption that notice and hearing are required prior to any taking of property. In discussing
the applicability of the due process clause to temporary deprivations of property, the
Di-Chent Court quoted Fuentes for the proposition that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day, or 50-day deprivations of property. Any
significant taking of property is within the purview of the Due Process Clause." 419
U.S. at 606, quoting 407 U.S. at 86. The Di-Chem Court, however, pointedly ignored
the sentence that followed the language quoted from Fuentes: "While the length and
consequent severity of a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining
the appropriate form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing
of some kind." 407 U.S. at 86 (emphasis added).
37. 419 U.S. at 606 (White, J.); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 200 (1974)
(White. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part): ". . . Fuentes merely required something more than an ex parte hearing before a court clerk."
38. 419 U.S. at 606.
39. Id. at 608.
40. 416 U.S. at 610, 618.
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commodate the conflicting interests of debtors and creditors. 1 DiChem indicates that where summary seizure procedures are needed to
protect creditor interests, safeguards against wrongful deprivations must
be provided. Di-Chem also implies that those safeguards approved in
Mitchell suffice in most cases. Yet it is unclear whether summary seizure
of wages works such great hardships on debtors and provides so few
benefits to creditors that prior notice and hearing are the only safeguards that will satisfy the due process clause when wages are gar2

nisheed.4

Apart from these difficulties, it is also unclear whether prejudgment seizure cases are applicable to postjudgment garnishment of
wages. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.,43 decided

in 1924, involved a due process challenge to New York postjudgment
garnishment procedures. The Supreme Court squarely held that due
process did not require that judgment debtors be given postjudgment
notice and opportunity to be heard prior to issuance of a wage garnishment writ.4 4 The Court reasoned that a judgment debtor has al-

ready had an opportunity to contest the justice of the judgment, and the
judgment places him on notice that wage garnishment may follow.

5

Though Endicott did not involve a statutory wage exemption, it suggests that constructive notice that wage garnishment may follow the
judgment provides an adequate safeguard against wrongful deprivation of exempt wages, at least where the debtor can initiate proceedings
to prevent issuance of garnishment process.
Endicott has been criticized,4

but has never been overruled. The

Court had a recent opportunity to do so in Moya v. DeBacca.47 In Moya,
a three-judge court had relied on Endicott in holding that New
Mexico postjudgment garnishment statutes permitting garnishment of
exempt wages without supplemental notice or hearing were not unconstitutional. 48 The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the Moya appeal

-just two weeks after it decided Sniadach.49 While the Court has recently cast doubt on the precedential value of its summary decisions? 0
41. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
42. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 201 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part): "The greater the level of deprivation which may flow from a decision, the less one may tolerate the risk of a mistaken decision .
43. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
44. Id. at 290.
45. Id. at 288-90.
46. See Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 740-42 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from dismissal of certiorari); notes 110-14 and accompanying text infra.
47. 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), aff'd, 395 U.S. 825 (1969).
48. 286 F. Supp. at 607.
49. 395 U.S. 825 (1969).
50. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
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Moya suggests that when wages are garnisheed following judgment, the
judgment provides adequate protection of the judgment debtor's property interest in wages.
The third due process interest involved in Brown-the property
interest in the entitlement-has been recognized only recently. The
basic approach to entitlement interests-once identified-was presented in Goldberg v. Kelly.51 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that
procedural due process was applicable to termination of welfare benefits. The Court stated that welfare "benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement," and could not be excluded from due process protections
by characterization as "privileges" rather than "rights."5 2 Though the
Goldberg v. Kelly Court suggested that welfare entitlements were akin
to property, it did not explicitly classify them as a property interest. 5 3
It did indicate, however, that a balancing test is to be applied in determining whether due process prohibits termination of a particular
entitlement before notice is given and a hearing held. The Court
stated: "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether the

recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental
interest in summary adjudication. ' ' 5 4 Goldberg v. Kelly found that the
welfare recipients had strong interests in receiving benefits pending
resolution of eligibility disputes. The Court noted that temporary
termination of such aid "may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
means by which to live while he waits." 55 The Court determined that
the recipient's strong interest, together with the governmental interest
in providing assistance to eligible recipients that underlies welfare
programs,," outweighed governmental interests in avoiding payment of
funds to those ultimately found to be ineligible.5 7
Goldberg v. Kelly was decided after both Sniadach and Moya. If
garnishment exemptions are entitlements, the Moya analysis is thus
incomplete and hence of tenuous value. But Goldberg v. Kelly did not
offer a general definition of entitlements. That definition was not provided until Board of Regents v. Roth. 5 The Roth Court made it clear
that entitlements were property interests, and again rejected the
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 262.
See id. n.8.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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notion that applicability of the due process clause to deprivations of
governmentally conferred benefits turns on whether a particular benefit is a "right" or a "privilege." 59 In attempting to provide concise
guidelines for identifying entitlements, the Court stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to
provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
60
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.

Roth, however, did not address the problem of determining what
legitimate expectations are created by statutes that couple the grant
of a benefit with explicit procedures for seeking that benefit. It was
thus unclear whether statutory procedures for asserting a benefit constituted one dimension of the entitlement.
That issue was raised in Arnett v. Kennedy.61 There a three-Justice
plurality took the view that any entitlement created by statutory and
regulatory provisions prohibiting employee discharge without cause
was necessarily limited by a provision setting forth discharge procedures.
In the plurality's view, the procedural provisions were an integral
part of and a limitation upon the entitlement. The plurality stated
that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, a litigant .. . must take the bitter with the
62

sweet."
The plurality's view was unacceptable to six members of the Court.
The position of those Justices, expressed in three opinions, was that
once government elects to confer an entitlement, it has created a pro59. Id. at 571 & n.9. In addition to cases cited by the Roth Court for the proposition that the rights-privileges distinction is no longer tenable, see cases cited in Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 211-12 n.7 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. 408 U.S. at 577.
61. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
62. Id. at 153-54. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart.
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perty interest to which the due process clause is fully applicable.6 3 In
the view of those Justices, it is the government that must "take the
bitter with the sweet"; once it grants an entitlement, the government
has created a property interest to which constitutional safeguards are
applicable despite statutory attempts to limit procedural protections. According to those Justices, treating procedural provisions as
limitations on entitlements would empower states to write exceptions
to the due process clause,64 or to revitalize by statutory edict the rejected
view that application of the due process clause turns on whether a
65
benefit is a right or a privilege.
Arnett thus suggested that procedural provisions do not constitute
one dimension of an entitlement. That suggestion was reinforced by
Goss v. Lopez," which addressed the due process rights of suspended
high school students. The Goss majority found that Ohio free-education and compulsory attendance laws gave students a claim of entitlement to a public education. 67 Though the Ohio statutes also gave
principals the power to suspend students, the majority treated that
provision as conditioning the entitlement only to the extent of permitting suspension for misconduct. The Court then held that the due
process clause required fundamentally fair procedures for determining
68
whether such misconduct had occurred.
The Goss minority reasoned:
[T]he very legislation which "defines" the "dimension" of the student's entitlement, while providing a right to education generally,
does not establish this right free of discipline imposed in accord with
Ohio law. Rather, the right is encompassed in the entire package of
statutory provisions governing education in Ohio-of which the
power to suspend [summarily] is one. 69
The dissenters asserted that the majority had read into Ohio law a
provision that suspensions were to be based on "cause." The minority
argued, in effect, that the lack of express "suspension for cause"
63. Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 185 (White, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); id. at 210-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's opinion
was joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice Marshall's opinion was joined by Justices
Douglas and Brennan.
64. Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 419 U.S. 565 (1975), noted in 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 301 (1975).
67. Id. at 573.
68. Id. at 574. The Goss Court also held that fundamentally fair procedures
were required because suspension for misconduct could affect liberty interests. See
notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
69. Id. at 586-87.
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language made the Goss entitlement distinguishable from the Arnett
entitlement. 70
Because Goss and Arnett were decided by shifting blocks of Justices,rl those cases are unstable precedents from which to draw generalizations concerning the scope of entitlements. But they do make it

clear that the threshold questions in any entitlement case are whether
an entitlement exists and what its dimensions are.
The Brown court reached its decision without extensively exploring
the complex questions surrounding the three due process interests. It
found, with little discussion, that Florida postjudgment garnishment
procedures affected protected property interests. It first noted that
wages were clearly property.7 2 It then found that the garnishment
exemption referred to in section 222.12, Florida Statutes, constitutes
73
a property interest under the entitlement theory recognized in Roth.
Though these are distinct property interests, and hence theoretically
require distinct due process analyses, the court may have confused
them. 74 Though such confusion may have hampered the court's at70. Id. at 587 n.4.
71. Justice Stewart joined the plurality opinion in Arnett, but voted with the majority in Goss. Justices Powell and Blackmun rejected the plurality view of entitlements
in Arnett, but dissented in Goss.
72. 392 F. Supp. at 1031.
73. Id.
74. The court was most unclear as to what interests it was addressing. Much of the
opinion was devoted to outlining the substantial hardships created by depriving debtors
of the use of wages, and the substantial risk of wrongful deprivation inherent in the
Florida procedure. Wrongful wage deprivation may certainly occur where no exemption
is claimed. For instance, a creditor may initiate wage garnishment even though he
knows other property exists by which to satisfy the judgment. FLA. STAT. § 77.03 (1973),
see note 6 supra, does not require verification of the creditor's claim that wages are
the only property available. Moreover, that section permits garnishment process to
issue before the return of execution. The Brown court's logic thus suggests that failure
to provide Mitchell-type protections for a judgment debtor's interest in wages, see 392
F. Supp. at 1034-36, makes Florida postjudgment wage garnishment procedures violative
of due process whether or not exemption statutes are considered. Cf. Bunton v. First
National Bank, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (Florida prejudgment garnishment
procedure declared unconstitutional).
Though the above considerations suggest the Brown court focused on the property
interest in wages, other aspects of the opinion suggest the court was concerned primarily
with the entitlement interest. The Brown court referred repeatedly, if ambiguously, to
the Roth statement that property interests may be created by state law, 392 F. Supp.
at 1031, 1037, and clearly stated that the purpose of requiring a prior hearing is to give
the debtor an opportunity to assert statutory exemptions. Id. at 1038.
Though it is uncertain which of the two property interests the court was addressing,
it is apparent that the court lost sight of the fact that two distinct property interests
were involved. It referred to the "uniquely valuable nature of the property right involved
herein," id. at 1037 (emphasis added), the "nature of the property interest" at issue, id.
at 1038 (emphasis added), and "the unique nature of the property interest involved in
this case," id. (emphasis added). While it is unclear whether that right/interest was
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tempts to distinguish Endicott and related cases, 75 it did not severely
affect the court's ability to balance the relevant interests.
Goldberg v. Kelly indicates that in entitlement cases due process
requirements are to be determined by weighing government interests
against those of the claimant to the entitlement.76 Mitchell suggests
that in garnishment and replevin cases, due process analysis should
focus on the competing interests of debtor and creditor. 77 The Brown
court framed its analysis in terms of government and debtor interests, 78
thereby implying that its primary concern was with the entitlement
interest. But the court also gave some consideration to the interests
of creditors in summary postjudgment garnishment. In considering
debtor interests, the court did not clearly state whether the interest
at issue was the property interest in wages, or the property interest
in the exemption. As a practical matter, the distinction makes little
difference; the impact on the debtor of garnisheeing exempt wages is
identical to the impact on him of wrongfully withholding the exemption.
"unique" because it was an entitlement, or was unique because it was an interest in
wages afforded special protection by Sniadach, it is obvious that the court was concerned with only one property right. See also id. at 1031, where language appears that
suggests the court thought the property interest in wages was extinguished by the judgment on the debt; the court may have treated the entitlement as revitalizing that
interest rather than constituting a distinct property right.
75. The court distinguished two cases that were arguably in conflict with its holding, Langford v. State, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), and Raigoza v. Sperl, 110
Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1973). Both of these cases could easily have been distinguished by
noting that they had failed to consider the ramifications of the entitlement doctrine. But
the Brown court did not explicitly make that distinction. It rejected Langford on the
bases that it placed undue reliance on Endicott, and that the property involved in Langford-an automobile-raised different notice risks than the property involved in Brownwages. 392 F. Supp. at 1036; see text accompanying notes 94-97, 109-16 infra. Though the
court's discussion of Raigoza seemed to be rooted in entitlement theory, the court did
not apply entitlement concepts rigorously. It stated the Raigoza court erred in taking
the view that "because the policy for legislative [wage] exemption was not constitutionally required, the constitutional requirement of procedural due process did not apply."
Id. at 1037. The Brown court indicated that view was incorrect, id., but failed to explain
why. The court also stated that the Raigoza court erred in failing to accept the argument that postjudgment garnishment involves different issues than those determined in
the main suit. The Brown court failed, however, to explain that those different issues
are relevant only if they relate to different protected interests-such as entitlements. Instead, the Brown court quarreled with Raigoza's allocation of the burden of proof. Id.
at 1038. That approach, of course, missed the point. The issue in both Brown and
Raigoza was not whether the debtor could be required to carry the burden of proving
he was qualified for an exemption, but whether his property could be taken before
he had a chance to meet his burden.
76. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
77. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
78. 392 F. Supp. at 1031-32.
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In balancing these interests, the court considered four basic factors:
the risk that Florida's postjudgment wage garnishment procedures
might wrongfully deprive a debtor of property, however defined; the
impact on the debtor of temporarily withholding exempt wages while
his exemption claim is litigated; the impact on the creditor of requiring notice and hearing before wages are garnisheed; and statutory provisions indicating the strength of the governmental interest in summary
wage garnishment procedure.
The Brown court found that the Florida procedure created
significant risks that a debtor qualified for the exemption would be
wrongfully-albeit temporarily-deprived of property. The court
stressed that the Florida law does not require the creditor to state under
oath that the debtor is unqualified for the statutory exemption. 9
Moreover, the writ may be issued by a court functionary rather than a
judge.80 The result, the court stated, is "substantial risk that a writ of
garnishment may be obtained by a creditor who knows full well . . .
that the debtor is the head of a family and is thus entitled to an exemp81
tion under state law."
The court stated that permitting seizure of judgment debtors'
exempt wages prior to notice and hearing has two serious effects.
First, it temporarily deprives wage earners of vital funds. Quoting
from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., the Brown court noted that

"wages are 'a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system,' "82 that wage garnishment "may impose a
'tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support,' "83
and that wage garnishment " 'may as a practical matter drive a wage
earning family to the wall.' "84 The Brown court noted that although
the Consumer Credit Protection Act 5 severely restricts use of wage
garnishment as a small-debt collection device, 8 it does permit garnishment of up to 25 percent of weekly disposable earnings."' The court
found that for many families, the temporary loss of that proportion

79. Id. at 1033-35. The court noted that Florida law once required the creditor to
swear that the debtor was ineligible for the wage exemption. Id. at 1033 n.7.
80. See id. at 1026, 1035.
81. Id. at 1033.
82. Id. at 1032, quoting 395 U.S. at 340.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1032, quoting 395 U.S. at 341-42 (footnote omitted).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970). Garnishment restrictions are
set out in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77.
86. 392 F. Supp. at 1032.
87. Id. at 1032, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970).
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of wages might well produce temporary deprivation of necessities of
life.

88

The second adverse effect noted by the court is the risk that wage
garnishment may cost the debtor his job. The court recognized that
garnishment procedures create substantial administrative burdens for
the garnishee and hence may induce him to discharge an employee
whose wages have been garnisheed.89 The Consumer Credit Protection
Act prohibits discharge based on garnishment for any one indebtedness." But a debtor whose wages have been garnisheed once is not
protected from discharge based on garnishment arising from a second
debt. Under Florida's procedure, a debtor might thus be discharged by
reason of a garnishment writ that should never have issued; since a
debtor with a valid but disputed exemption claim cannot prevent
issuance of the garnishment writ, he may find himself victorious but
unemployed when the court finally rules.91
The court noted further that these adverse effects are exacerbated
by failure to require a prompt hearing on exemption claims. Failure
to provide a prompt hearing increases the economic impact on a
debtor by extending the period during which he will be deprived of
exempt wages. It also extends the period during which the garnisheed
employer is subjected to the administrative burdens of garnishment,
and thereby gives the employer increased reason to discharge the employee. 2 Though a tort action for wrongful garnishment is available,
the Brown court stated that such a remedy does little to reduce the adverse effects of wage garnishment on the debtor8
The Brown court dealt summarily with creditors' interests in summary garnishment. Like the Sniadach Court, 4 the Brown court found
88. Id. at 1032, quoting Note, Florida Wage Garnishment: An Anachronistic Remedy,
23 U. FLA. L. REv. 681, 687 (1971).
89. Id. at 1033-34 & n.8. In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285
(1924), the Court rejected the contention that administrative burdens imposed on the
garnisheed employer violated the employer's constitutional rights. Id. at 290.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970).
91. See 392 F. Supp. at 1033.
92. See id. at 1035 & n.11. See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610,
618 (1974) (White, J.) (implies provision of prompt hearing reduces impact on debtor
of summary seizure); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 192 (1974) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part): "The impact of deprivation increases, of course, the longer
the time period between the initial deprivation and the opportunity to have a full
hearing."
93. 392 F. Supp. at 1033. See also id. at 1035 (requirement that debtor show malice
to recover for wrongful garnishment, Strickland v. Commerce Loan Co., 158 So. 2d 814
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963), makes Florida cause of action distinguishable from Louisiana
provision involved in Mitchell that permitted debtor to recover damages for wrongful
garnishment).
94. 395 U.S. at 339 ("[S]ummary procedure may well meet the requirements of due
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no basis for assuming that preseizure notice and hearing would subject
creditors to undue economic or administrative burdens. 95 The opinion
did, however, imply that wage garnishment was distinguishable from
seizures of other forms of property. The court suggested that giving
debtors notice of impending seizure of tangible property exposed
creditors to possible destruction or secretion of the property.9 6 The
court stated that such risks were minimal when wages were garnisheed,
since "it is highly improbable that a wage earner will quit his job to
frustrate the efforts of his judgment creditor. The reason is that wages
generally provide the exclusive means upon which the wage earner
''
supports himself and his family.

7

Finally, the Brown court stated that the Consumer Credit Protection Act indicated wage garnishment was a disfavored governmental
interest.98 Though it did not do so, the court might have noted that
a governmental interest exists in assuring that exempt wages are not
temporarily withheld from debtors. The purpose of Florida's exemption
provision is "to preserve to the unfortunate debtor and his family a
'
means of living without becoming a charge upon the public."99
Temporary withholding of exempt wages clearly frustrates that purpose. 100
process in extraordinary situations. . . . But in the present case no situation requiring
special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented by the facts.
95. 392 F. Supp. at 1038. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
96. Id. at 1036.
97. Id.; see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974) (White, J.) ("[Lan
Sniadach . . . obviously the creditor's claim [of need for summary wage garnishment]
could not rest on the danger of destruction of wages, the property seized, since their
availability to satisfy the debt remained within the power of the debtor who could
simply leave his job."); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 193 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (in Sniadach, provision of notice and hearing
prior to garnishment exposed creditor to minimal risks of loss, and those risks that
existed resulted from creditor's decision to extend unsecured credit).
98. 392 F. Supp. at 1032. See id. at 1037, 1038. The court relied heavily, id. at 1032,
on congressional findings set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1970):
(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal services
encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such extensions of
credit divert money into excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the production and flow of goods in interstate commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy frequently results
in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of employment,
production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
(3) The great disparities among the laws of the several States relating to
garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and
frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country.
99. Elvine v. Public Fin. Co., 196 So. 2d 25, 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
see Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
100. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1969) (government interest that
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The Brown court concluded that the Florida procedure created
substantial risks of wrongful deprivation, and that such deprivation
could produce undue hardships on debtors. It therefore declared the
Florida procedure unconstitutional, holding that the due process
clause requires that judgment debtors be afforded notice and an opportunity to assert statutory exemptions before their wages are garnisheed.' 0 '

Though the balance reached by the Brown court seems reasonable,
it may be irrelevant. Endicott and Moya seemed to control the Brown
situation. The court did not distinguish Endicott convincingly, and
totally ignored Moya. If the court had carefully distinguished the
property interest in the entitlement from the property interest in
wages, Endicott and Moya would have posed no problem. Both cases
were decided before the entitlement doctrine was enunciated. They
thus speak only to the debtor's property interest in the use of his

wages.
To the extent that Brown does rest on entitlement theory, it is
seriously flawed. Despite the court's assertion that section 222.12 is
unambiguous,'102 Roth, Arnett, and Goss raise the possibility that the
section's procedural provisions limit the scope of any entitlement interest. The Brown court totally ignored that possibility. Considered in
isolation, section 222.12 would probably be construed by at least four
underlies provision of welfare benefits also counsels uninterrupted provision of benefits
to eligible persons).
101. 392 F. Supp. at 1038.
102. Id. at 1028. Though §§ 77.01, 77.03. 222.11, and 222.12 are obviously difficult to
reconcile, at least one Florida court has done so. See Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d
802, 804-05 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961). At the time Noland was decided, § 77.03 required that a judgment creditor file an affidavit stating the amount of judgment and
averring a belief that the judgment debtor had no visible property on which levy could
be made. The question before the court was whether § 222.11 required that the
creditor's affidavit include an averment that the debtor was ineligible for a garnishment exemption. The court concluded that such an averment was necessary to implement the policy of § 222.11, even though § 77.03 did not explicitly require that the
creditor negative exemptions. The Noland court held that § 222.11 "is a limitation upon
the court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of garnishment unless it affirmatively appears by
sworn affidavit that the money or other thing sought to be garnisheed is not due for
personal labor or services to a head of a family residing in this state." Id. at 804. The
court also found that § 222.12 was "intended to provide the procedural vehicle
by which a judgment debtor may claim the exemption accorded him by the statute in
the event . . . a writ of garnishment issues ..... " Id. at 805. The Noland question has
been rendered moot by an amendment to § 77.03 that states the creditor's motion for
a garnishment writ need "not be verified or negative defendant's exemptions." Fla. Laws
1967, ch. 67-254, § 27 (§ 77.03). But the Noland case, together with Elvine v. Public
Fin. Co., 196 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), suggests that Florida courts
will construe Florida's various provisions affecting wage garnishment in favor of the
debtor.
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members of the Supreme Court as defining one dimension of the entitlement. While the section recognizes the exemption, it appears to
attach significant limitations on any entitlement to that exemption. In
essence, section 222.12 suggests that at the time his wages are garnisheed
a judgment debtor has no more than a right to claim an exemption; no
entitlement to an exemption arises, and hence no basis for contesting
withholding of wages, unless the debtor prevails on that claim. 11 3 So

construed, Florida procedures permitting wage garnishment of arguably exempt wages without notice and hearing deprive a debtor of no
entitlement.
If the Brown court had considered this problem, it could easily
have solved it by looking beyond section 222.12. Section 222.11 expressly prohibits issuance of garnishment writs that "attach or delay the
payment of" wages of heads of households. 0 4 It thus gives judgment
debtors a legitimate expectation that qualified wages will never be
garnisheed. This entitlement exists prior to and independent of the
procedure for claiming exemptions set out in section 222.12. Because
section 222.11 grants the entitlement in express terms, even the Goss
dissenters might be persuaded that it is analogous to the express "termination for cause" provisions at issue in Arnett.10 5 Arnett requires

that statutory procedures producing deprivation of entitlements meet
the mandate of the due process clause. Thus section 222.12 is not selfjustifying. Because the procedures embodied in section 222.12 temporarily deprive judgment debtors of the entitlement created by
section 222.11, those procedures are invalid if they do not afford the
debtor due process.
If the Brown court had based its holding on the above entitlement
rationale, Endicott and Moya could have been easily distinguished.
Endicott involved no issue akin to the entitlement interest. Even if a
wage exemption had been at issue in Endicott, it is unlikely that the
Court would have found that it required due process protections. At
the time Endicott was decided, statutory benefits were classified as
"rights" or "privileges."' 10 6 The due process clause applied only to
103. In Elvine v. Public Fin. Co., 196 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
the court stated in dicta: "The exemption is for the benefit of the debtor, and its
benefit may only be accorded to him by the statutory termination of the proceedings."
Id. at 26.
104. See note 7 supra.
105. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
106. For discussion of the rights/privileges distinction in due process cases and its
gradual erosion prior to recognition of the entitlement doctrine, see Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968).
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rights, and in all probability the Endicott Court would have classified
10 7
a garnishment exemption as a privilege.
Moya, too, was decided without the benefit of Roth, Arnett, or
Goss. Moya begs the question that those cases raise: whether a state
violates the due process clause by simultaneously granting an entitlement and requiring a judgment debtor to clear a series of procedural
hurdles before he may benefit from that entitlement. If the Moya court
had addressed the entitlement question, it could not have foreclosed the
debtor's due process attack simply by reference to the Endicott case.
To resolve the entitlement issue, the Moya court would have had to
determine whether an entitlement existed, the scope of any entitlement found, and whether temporary denial of such entitlement, however qualified, must be preceded by a hearing. The Moya court addressed none of these issues. It simply stated that New Mexico's exemption statutes were not self-executing and that the judgment debtor was
required to assert successfully his exemption claim before exempt wages
108
could be recovered.
While the Brown court might have outflanked the Endicott-Moya
rule by applying entitlement theory, it chose a frontal attack. The
court asserted, in effect, that Endicott had been impliedly overruled
by later cases. 0 9 In rejecting Endicott, the court relied primarily on
Justice Douglas' dissent to the dismissal of certiorari in Hanner v. DeMarcus.1 0 Mrs. Hanner was a judgment debtor whose property had
been levied upon and sold without supplemental notice. State law provided that a judgment debtor could select the property to be levied
upon. But because Mrs. Hanner had no notice of execution and sale,
she did not do so. The judgment creditor was thus able to levy upon
real property worth far more than the judgment, and purchase that
property at judicial sale for far less than its market value.
Justice Douglas' dissent, joined by Justices Warren and Black,
argued that due process notice concepts had evolved to the point that
the Endicott constructive notice rationale was no longer tenable. Justice
107. Cf. Myers v. Moran, 99 N.Y. Supp, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (wage exemption is
"a gratuity, not a vested right").
108. 286 F. Supp. at 608. These statements merely reflected the procedural provisions of the New Mexico scheme. The court made no attempt-since none seemed
necessary-to determine whether those provisions violated the due process clause by
temporarily depriving the debtor of a property interest in the exemption. The Moya
court might, of course, have reached the same result under the entitlement theory. If
it had closely examined the relevant statutes, it might have found that an entitlement
to an exemption arose only after the debtor successfully asserted his claim. Cf. note 120
infra.
109. 392 F. Supp. at 1036.
110. 390 U.S. 736 (1968).
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Douglas placed particular reliance on Griffin v. Griffin,"' decided in
1946. The Griffin Court had held that although a divorce decree
ordering payment of alimony gave the petitioner constructive notice
that further proceedings might follow to enforce that obligation, actual
notice was required of any later proceedings seeking a judgment for
unpaid alimony. Supplementary notice was required, the Court reasoned, because proceedings to reduce the alimony obligation to judgment
"substantially ...
'

112

affect [Griffin's] rights in ways in which the [initial]
The rights to which the Griffin Court referred were

decree did not."
the opportunities afforded by statute to seek modification of the original
decree and assert defenses to the claim that alimony was due and
unpaid. The Court's chief concern was that these rights might be cut
off by the judgment. But the Court noted that even if the judgment
could be set aside on a showing that defenses to the judgment existed,
the fact that Griffin's property could be levied upon as soon as the
judgment was entered negated any argument that the judgment without
notice did not affect substantial rights. The Court stated: "There can
be no doubt that a levy upon any property petitioner might have . . .
would substantially, and in at least some instances, permanently affect
his rights. We cannot say that this could be done without notice of
' 3
the proceeding said to justify the levy." "

If the Griffin reference to the "proceeding said to justify the levy"
referred to a judgment, Griffin neither overruled Endicott nor controlled Hanner. In Endicott, the debtor had notice of the judgment
and asserted no claim that wage garnishment would affect any right
other than his property interest in wages. The Hanner debtor also
had notice of the judgment. Justice Douglas argued in Hanner that
execution and sale, like the unpaid alimony judgment in Griffin, were
proceedings that affected substantial rights in ways that the original
judgment did not. 1 4 That assertion, however, rested on the unexamined
premise that statutory provisions permitting the debtor to select property by which to satisfy the judgment created a liberty or property
interest protected by the due process clause. If these provisions created
no protected interest, no basis existed for arguing that due process
notice requirements were applicable to the proceedings following
judgment. By contrast, the Court took Griffin beyond the Endicott
rule by recognizing protected interests other than those at stake in the
initial proceeding.
111.
112.
113.
114.

327 U.S. 220 (1946).
Id. at 229 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 232.
390 U.S. at 742.
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The Brown court recognized none of these distinguishing factors.
It simply stated it found Justice Douglas' reasoning "to be applicable to
the instant case and is all the more persua[sive] ...

when one considers

that these statements were made before Sniadach, Fuentes, Goldberg v.
' The reference
Kelly... and their progeny.""to these cases apparently
was meant to suggest that since Endicott the Supreme Court had reached
a new balance between conflicting interests of creditors and debtors.
The Brown court stated that "the instant case is stronger than these
others because of the disfavored nature of the governmental function
and the uniquely valuable nature of the property right involved herein."" 6 The Brown court thus seemed to conclude that Sniadach's
recognition of the importance of property interests in wages made
the Endicott constructive notice rationale untenable.
The fact that Moya was summarily affirmed within days of the
Sniadach decision makes that conclusion questionable. The Brown
court did, however, suggest a more solid basis for its result by referring
to Goldberg and stating that "post-judgment garnishment involves
significantly different legal issues than those arising under the proceedings to secure the judgment. ' ' 117 The court failed to explain the

relevance of Goldberg v. Kelly or the "different issue" observation to
Endicott."" But if the court had developed the point, it could have
115. 392 F. Supp. at 1037.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The court's undeveloped reference to Goldberg v. Kelly is of little import.
Goldberg v.Kelly assumed that an entitlement existed. To analogize Goldberg v.Kelly to
Brown, the court needed to show that an entitlement existed, and that procedural provisions related to that entitlement did not so limit it in scope as to foreclose a claim
that the due process clause required notice and hearing prior to wage garnishment.
Similarly, the observation that wage garnishment and the underlying judgment involved different issues is irrelevant in itself; no inherent right to be heard on different
issues exists unless that hearing operates to protect an interest subject to the due
process clause. The Brown court failed to relate its "different issue" observation to either
of the property interests at stake. As to the property interest in wages, the court might
have reasoned that the exemption gave the debtor a means of protecting that interest
that did not exist until after judgment. Thus, the court might have reasoned, even
though under Endicott the initial proceedings gave her constructive notice her wages
might be garnisheed, they did not provide an opportunity to be heard on the propriety
of garnisheeing those wages. This analysis, of course, would require a determination
that, whether or not the exemption were an entitlement, it arose as soon as judgment
was entered. If that determination were made, the court could then have proceeded to
consider whether the Florida procedures permitting delay of the hearing adequately
protected the property interest in wages.
If the court had focused on the entitlement interest, it could have shown that the
initial proceedings neither provided notice that plaintiff's entitlement to an exemption
would be temporarily withheld, see page 647 infra, nor provided an opportunity to raise
objections to that temporary deprivation.
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shown that the emergence of entitlement theories made Brown distinguishable from Endicott.
Had the Brown court adequately analyzed Florida's wage exemption statutes, it could have shown that an entitlement to a wage exemption existed and was not limited in scope by the procedural provisions
of section 222.12.119 If that entitlement had been firmly established,
Endicott could easily have been distinguished. In Endicott, the debtor
was placed on constructive notice only that further proceedings might
ensue that would affect his property interest in the continued use of
wages and personalty. The judgment did not place him on constructive
notice that action might be taken affecting other property interests.
Phrased otherwise, Endicott means only that a judgment places the
debtor on constructive notice that the judgment creditor will initiate
proceedings to seize whatever property state law permits. But the judgment debtor cannot be expected to foresee that the judgment creditor
will attempt to seize assets the state has indicated are immune from
execution. If the judgment debtor has an entitlement to an exemption,
the judgment places him on notice only that the creditor will attempt
to levy on nonexempt assets. The debtor thus cannot be expected to
initiate proceedings to prevent judgment creditors from temporarily
depriving him of property-his entitlement to a wage exemption-that
the state has placed beyond the reach of creditors. If state law permits
the judgment creditor to deprive a judgment debtor of that property
temporarily, the debtor has sound grounds to attack that law as a violation of due process.
The above rationale makes it apparent why Moya could properly
be affirmed after Endicott and Sniadach but does not control cases
arising after Goldberg v. Kelly, Roth, Arnett, and Goss. Sniadach requires only that a temporary seizure of wages be preceded by notice
and opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of depriving the wage
earner of his property interest in wages. Under Endicott, the judgment
debtor has constructive notice that the creditor may initiate proceedings to seize that property. But after Goldberg v. Kelly, Roth, Arnett,
and Goss, a debtor may have a property interest to which the initial
judgment does not speak-his entitlement to a wage exemption. If
that entitlement is not limited in scope by procedural statutes, the
debtor can correctly contend that garnishment of exempt wages constitutes a deprivation of a property interest that was not at stake in the
suit on the debt.
In summary, Brown probably reached the correct result. But because the court failed to analyze adequately the entitlement interests
S119.See notes 102-05 and accompanying text supra.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

at issue, the decision is open to attack on the ground that any entitlement created by section 222.12 is so limited that judgment debtors cannot assert a right to an unqualified exemption. Nonetheless, judgment
debtors who look beyond section 222.12 stand an excellent chance of
success even if Brown is reversed. The question for Florida, then, is
how to modify its garnishment statutes so as to avoid due process
attacks.
The legislature can choose among several possible approaches.
First, it might eliminate the wage exemption entirely, thereby eliminating the entitlement issue. Even if that approach were desirable from a
public policy standpoint, it might prove ineffective. Despite Moya, the
possibility remains that the Supreme Court might ultimately rule that
wages are so sensitive that they may not be garnisheed unless the debtor
is given prior notice and an opportunity to show that other, less sensitive, assets exist by which to satisfy the judgment. Secondly, the legislature might attempt to modify the wage exemption so that any entitlement arises only when the debtor proves his eligibility. 120 While
that approach would theoretically avoid the entitlement problem, it
might not be successful. Goss and Arnett suggest the Supreme Court will
not tolerate attempts to avoid the due process clause by qualification
of the entitlement.
A third approach is to escape the entitlement difficulty by adopting
procedures that will alter the balance of creditor and debtor interests.
The legislature might, for instance, attempt to minimize the initial
risk of wrongful deprivation of the entitlement by requiring a judge
to authorize garnishment, and by requiring that the creditor seeking
garnishment show to that judge in ex parte proceedings that the debtor
is unqualified for exemptions and has no other property that can be
levied upon.1 21 Such ex parte procedures should be coupled with a
120. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 690 (West Supp. 1975), which divides assets
into two classes: those which are exempt from execution without filing an exemption
claim, and those which are exempt "when claim for exemption is made . . . by the
judgment debtor ....." As interpreted in Raigoza v. Sperl, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App.
1973), the latter class of assets is not exempt as soon as the claim is made; the debtor
must prevail on his claim before the wages are released. See CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §
690.50 (West Supp. 1975). In holding that temporary wage deprivations resulting from
these procedures did not violate the due process clause, the Raigoza court did not apply
entitlement concepts. Had it done so, it could not have reached its result without finding:
(1) no entitlement to the wage exemption created by CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 690.6 (West
Supp. 1975) exists before the debtor files a claim; and (2) the procedural provisions
contained in CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.50 (West Supp. 1975) limit the scope of that
entitlement by requiring the debtor to prevail on his claim before he may benefit from
the exemption.
121. In discussing the risk of wrongful deprivation, the Brown court repeatedly
noted that Florida did not require that the creditor's motion be verified, or that it
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requirement that the creditor indemnify the debtor for any losses
incurred by temporary deprivation of his entitlement, a requirement
that a prompt hearing be afforded the debtor on exemption claims, and
a prohibition against employers discharging employees on the basis
of wage garnishment unless a court has ruled that any exemption
claims are unfounded. Such an approach might alter enough of the
factors considered in the Brown balancing test to meet due process
requirements. Since the possibility exists that reputational interests
may be affected by wage garnishment procedures, 122 the legislature
should buttress these provisions by prohibiting garnishors and garnishees from informing third parties of the garnishment unless a
debtor is ruled unqualified for any exemption.
The simplest solution, however, is to require that judgment debtors
be afforded notice of garnishment proceedings and an opportunity to
assert exemptions before a wage garnishment writ issues." 3 If the
Brown and Mitchell courts are correct, such a procedure would have
minimal impact on creditors," 24 and would protect judgment debtors

against government action that may wrongfully deprive them of funds
needed to acquire necessities of life.
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negate the debtor's exemptions. See note 79 and accompanying text supra. At a minimum,
any revision of Florida's garnishment laws should therefore require more than the conclusory allegations that now suffice for issuance of a garnishment writ.
122. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
123. Fla. S. 170 (1975) would have added the following provision to both FLA. STAT. §
77.03 (1973) (procurement of postjudgment garnishment writ) and FLA. STAT. § 77.031
(1973) (procurement of prejudgment garnishment writ): "Before a writ of garnishment
shall issue for any money or other thing due the defendant for personal labor or services
the defendant shall be given notice and a court hearing at which the application of
any exemptions provided for by law shall be determined."
The Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee deleted the provision affecting § 77.03 (postjudgment garnishment) and substituted the following language for the provision affecting § 77.031 (prejudgment garnishment):
Before a writ of garnishment shall issue the defendant shall be given notice
and opportunity for a court hearing at which the probable validity of the allegations in the plaintiff's motion for the writ and the application of any exemptions provided for by law shall be determined. Notice to the defendant of the proposed garnishment shall be accompanied by a copy of plaintiff's motion for writ
of garnishment and shall state the possibility of defendants' entitlement to exemptions and the opportunity for a hearing if a motion requesting such hearing is
filed and served within five days. If, within five days after the service of the
notice of the proposed garnishment, the defendant has not filed with the court
and served the plaintiff with a motion requesting the court hearing, then the
writ shall issue without the prior hearing.
As amended, the bill was passed by the senate, FA. S. JouR. 560 (1975). It was then referred to the House Judiciary Committee, FLA. H.R. JouR. 1014 (1975), where it died.
124. See notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra.

